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Bankruptcy
by W. Homer Drake, Jr.*
and
James W. Dilz**
I.

INTRODUCTION

During 1994 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit decided thirteen cases under the Bankruptcy Code ("Code")' in
the areas of discharge and dischargeability, preferences, fraudulent
transfers, exemptions, lien avoidance, executory contracts, administrative expenses, postconfirmation default, attorney fees, substantive
consolidation, and bankruptcy fraud. This Article is a survey of the
bankruptcy decisions by the Eleventh Circuit in 1994.
II.

A.

DISCHARGE AND DISCHARGEABILITY

Deadline for Filing Complaint
In Durham Ritz, Inc. v. Williamson (In re Williamson),' the Eleventh

Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a dischargeability complaint filed
seventy-six days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors.'
The Eleventh Circuit followed the opinion of the district court, which
was attached to the Eleventh Circuit's one-sentence decision as an
appendix.4 This decision illustrates that bankruptcy attorneys must be

* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Georgia. Mercer University
(BA., 1954; LL.B, 1956). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Miami
University (B.A., 1980); Ohio State University (J.D., 1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
2. 15 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 1994).
3. Id. at 1038.
4. Id. at 1038-40.
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aware of, and comply with, deadlines in the Code and Bankruptcy Rules
irrespective of notices issued by the clerk.
The debtor, Joe Williamson, filed a Chapter 11 petition on November
14, 1991. The clerk issued a notice stating that the deadline for filing
dischargeability complaints pursuant to section 523(c)5 of the Code was
"to be set." On March 5, 1992, sixteen days after the deadline set forth
in Bankruptcy Rule 4007,' Durham Ritz, Inc. ("Durham") filed a
complaint alleging that its debt was nondischargeable under section
523(a)(2)(A).' Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) provides that "[a) complaint to
determine the dischargeability of any debt pursuant to Section 523(c) of
the Code shall be filed not later than 60 days following the first date set
for the meeting of creditors held pursuant to Section 341(a). 9 The
bankruptcy court dismissed Durham's complaint as untimely. °
Durham appealed, arguing that the complaint was timely according to
the clerk's notice, that the failure of the clerk to give thirty-day notice
of the deadline as required by Bankruptcy Rule 4007 tolled the sixty-day
period, that the defective notice violated Durham's Fifth Amendment
right of due process, and that equity demanded that the complaint be
decided on its merits."
Relying upon two circuit court decisions, Neeley v. Murchison2 and
Byrd v. Alton (In re Alton),' 3 the district court rejected all four arguments. 14 The Fifth Circuit held in Neeley that a creditor was on notice
of the deadline for filing objections to dischargeability, even though the
clerk's notice left the space for the deadline blank and the clerk
subsequently gave assurances that no deadline had been set. 5 In
Alton, the Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning of Neeley stating that
[a] holding that the language of Rule 4007(c) about notice gives a
creditor the right to such official notice before he is under a duty to
make inquiries to protect his own rights would conflict with the
language of 11 U.S.C. Section 523, which makes actual notice sufficient
to impose a duty-to-inquire on the creditor."6

5.

11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (1988).

6.

15 F.3d at 1039.

7.

Id.; FED. R. BANER. P. 4007.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1988).
15 F.3d at 1039 (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c)).
Id.
Id.
815 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1987).
837 F.2d 457 (11th Cir. 1988).
15 F.3d at 1039-40.
Id. at 1039 (citing Neeley, 815 F.2d at 345).
Id. (quoting Alton, 837 F.2d at 460).
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In accordance with these precedents, the district court held that
Durham acted "unreasonably" by waiting for a further notice from the
clerk instead of complying with Bankruptcy Rule 4007."7 Furthermore,
because Durham had written notice of the bankruptcy filing, the sixtyday period of Bankruptcy Rule 4007 was not tolled, nor did the Fifth
Amendment entitle Durham to additional notice of the deadline. s
Finally, the district court found that Durham's inaction caused the late
filing, not the debtor or the clerk, so equity did not justify relief from the
deadline. 9
To avoid suffering a fate similar to Durham, if there is any ambiguity
about a deadline that may affect a client's rights, counsel should assume
that the courts will strictly enforce the time periods prescribed in the
Code and Bankruptcy Rules.
B. Procedurefor Extension of Time
In Coggin v. Coggin (In re Coggin),2" the Eleventh Circuit clarified
the procedure for obtaining an extension of time under Bankruptcy Rule
4004(b)2 ' to object to the debtor's discharge under section 72722 of the
Code. The debtor, Thomas E. Coggin, filed a Chapter 7 petition on April
25, 1989.' The last day to file a complaint objecting to the debtor's
discharge was August 4, 1989. On July 28, 1989, the Chapter 7 trustee
filed a motion pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b) to extend the
deadline, and the debtor's ex-wife, Phyllis B. Coggin, filed an identical
motion on August 3, 1989.24 The bankruptcy court granted both
motions without affording the debtor notice or an opportunity for a
25
hearing.

The Chapter 7 trustee and Mrs. Coggin both filed complaints objecting
to the debtor's discharge under section 727 of the Code.26 The debtor

17. Id.
18. Id. The court distinguished this case from the publication of an erroneous deadline
by the clerk. Id.
19. Id. at 1040.
20. 30 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1994).
21. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(b). This rule provides that "[oin motion of any party in
interest, after hearing on notice, the court may extend for cause the time for filing a
complaint objecting to discharge. The motion shall be made before such time has expired."
Id.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
23. 30 F.3d at 1445.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Mrs. Coggin also filed an objection to the dischargeability of her claim for past-due
alimony in the amount of $17,486.50. Id.

1246

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

moved to dismiss both complaints on the grounds that they were not
filed by the deadline and that the bankruptcy court improperly granted
the extensions.' The bankruptcy court acknowledged that it erred in
extending the deadlines ex parte, so the bankruptcy court vacated its
earlier orders and scheduled the extension motions for a hearing.
Following the hearing, the bankruptcy court granted the extensions for
a second time and denied the debtor's motion to dismiss." The district
court affirmed,' as did the Eleventh Circuit.30
At issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the Chapter 7
trustee and Mrs. Coggin timely made their motions to extend the
deadline for filing their respective objections to discharge.3
The
Chapter 7 trustee failed to serve the motion on either the debtor or his
attorney, and Mrs. Coggin served only the debtor's attorney. Pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rule 901432 and Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(9),33 if a
motion under Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b) is served by mail, the moving
party must serve both the debtor and the debtor's attorney.'
The
debtor argued that a party moving for an extension of time under
Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b) has not made the motion until that party
completes service. Since there was no question that neither the Chapter
7 trustee nor Mrs. Coggin attempted to serve the debtor, the debtor
reasoned that the bankruptcy court lost jurisdiction to grant the
extensions after the original deadline passed.'
The Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected the premise that a party
makes a motion under Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b) when they complete
service.' Instead, a party makes the motion when they file it." "[I1f
a motion is filed but not served prior to the bar date, the jurisdictional
requirement of rule 4004(b) is met, and the bankruptcy court retains
jurisdiction to extend the bar date if service is proper, or to employ its

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1445-46.
1446.
1451.
1446.

32. FED. R. BANHR. P. 9014.
33. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(b)(9).
34. 30 F.3d at 1447.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1448-49.
37. Id. at 1449. The Eleventh Circuit refused to follow two indistinguishable
bankruptcy cases concluding that motions to extend the bar date for filing objections to
discharge are not "made" unless and until served. Id at 1448 (citing In re Friscia, 123 B.R.
9 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Mancini, No. 85-30168, 1986 WL 28905 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 1986)).
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equitable powers if service is not perfected properly.", In light of the
fact that the bankruptcy court approved both motions ex parte, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the failure of the Chapter 7 trustee and
Mrs. Coggin to effect service upon the debtor and the debtor's attorney
was excusable.3 9 Therefore, the extensions were valid.'
The lesson of Coggin is very simple. When seeking to extend the time
for filing an objection to discharge, the movant should ideally file and
serve the motion upon both the debtor and debtor's counsel before the
bar date.
Review of Bankruptcy Court's FactualFindings
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Equitable Bank v. Miller (In re
Miller)41 illustrates the deference given to the bankruptcy court's
factual findings in an adversary proceeding involving objections to
discharge and dischargeability. Equitable Bank filed a complaint
against the debtors, Dr. Arthur Miller and Janet Miller, pursuant to
Equitable Bank based its
sections 523(a)(2)(B) 2 and 727(a)(2)(A).'
dischargeability objection under section 523(a)(2)(B) on alleged false
financial statements the debtors submitted to the bank." The bank
based its objection to discharge under section 727(a)(2)(A) on the alleged
fraudulent transfer Dr. Miller made to his medical partner, Dr. Sylvan
Sarasohn, of nine parcels of real property in satisfaction of two notes
totaling $1,105,000.' s The bankruptcy court found no intent to deceive
with respect to either the financial statements' or the transfer to Dr.
Sarasohn.47 The district court reversed and sustained both objections,
but the Eleventh8 Circuit concluded that the reversal by the district court
was erroneous.
"Because a determination concerning fraudulent intent depends
largely upon an assessment of the credibility and demeanor of the
debtor, deference to the bankruptcy court's factual findings is particularC.

38. Id. at 1450.
39. Id.
40. Id.at 1451.

41. 39 F.3d 301 (11th Cir. 1994).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2XB) (1988).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (1988).

44. 39 F.3d at 303-04.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 306-07.
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ly appropriate." 9 The bankruptcy court may look at the "totality of the
circumstances" to infer the debtor's fraudulent intent.50 A circuit court
conducts a de novo review of a district court's holding that the bankruptcy court's factual findings were clearly erroneous.5 1
During the bench trial before the bankruptcy court, Dr. Miller gave
plausible explanations for both the financial statements and the transfer
to Dr. Sarasohn. 52 Therefore, the district court improperly reversed the
bankruptcy court's finding that the debtors lacked the requisite
fraudulent intent under sections 523(a)(2)(B) and 727(a)(2)(A)."
III.

RECOVERY OF ASSETS OF THE ESTATE

A.

Preferences: Adoption of Deprizio
In Galloway v. First Alabama Bank (In re Wesley Industries, Inc.)"
the Eleventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand
Financial Corp. (In re V N. Deprizio Construction Co.),55 holding that
the one-year reachback period applies to the avoidance of preferences to
creditors whose claims are guaranteed by insiders of the debtor.'
Wesley and Deprizio are only applicable, however, in bankruptcy cases
filed prior to October 22, 1994. Congress legislatively overturned
Deprizio in section 202 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,"7 which
amended section 550' of the Code.. These amendments are effective in
bankruptcy cases filed on or after October 22, 1994.' 9

49. Id. at 305 (quoting Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Burgess (In re Burgess), 955
F.2d 134, 137 (1st Cir. 1992)). The Eleventh Circuit also quoted Bankruptcy Rule 8013,
which provides:
On appeal the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel may affirm, modify or
reverse a bankruptcy judge's judgment, order, or decree or remand with
instructions for further proceedings. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
Id. at 305 n.2 (quoting FED. R. BANK. P. 8013).
50. Id. at 305.
51. Id. (citing Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Sublett (In re Sublett), 895 F.2d
1381, 1384 (11th Cir. 1990)).
52. Id. at 305, 307.
53. Id. at 306, 307.
54. 30 F.3d 1438 (11th Cir. 1994).
55. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
56. 30 F.3d at 1441.
57. Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 202, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
59. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 702, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
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In Wesley First Alabama Bank ("First Alabama") made working capital
loans to the debtor, Wesley Industries, Inc., beginning in 1986; the
debtor secured the loans with inventory and accounts receivable. On
May 25, 1989, the parties renewed and consolidated four draw notes.'
In connection with the renewal and consolidation, the debtor gave First
Alabama additional collateral, including a first mortgage on real
property in Talladega County, Alabama, and a security interest in
machinery, equipment, furniture, fixtures, and other personal property.61 Jack Boykin, the debtor's president, director, and majority
shareholder, guaranteed the loans. 2
On February 21, 1990, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition. The
bankruptcy court later converted the case to Chapter 7.' The Chapter
7 trustee filed an adversary proceeding to avoid as a preference the
debtor's grant of additional collateral to First Alabama more than ninety
days, but within one year, prior to the bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee on his preference claim, and the
district court affirmed."
This case presented a question of first impression to the Eleventh
Circuit.'
The preference statute allows a trustee to avoid certain
transfers made by a debtor within ninety days of the bankruptcy
filing.? Subsection 547(b)(4)(B)67 extends the ninety-day preference
period to one year where the payment is to or for the benefit of an
insider.? Since First Alabama was not an insider and the debtor
pledged additional collateral between ninety days and one year before
the bankruptcy filing, the only way the debtor could avoid the pledge of
additional collateral was if it was made "to or for the benefit of a creditor
who was an insider at the time of the transfer.0
Although First
Alabama was not an insider, the pledge of additional collateral
benefitted Boykin, who was an insider.7" Each dollar of additional
collateral the debtor pledged reduced Boykin's exposure by the same
amount.7

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

30 F.3d at 1440.
Id.
Id. at 1441.
Id. at 1440.
Id.
Id. at 1441.
Id. at 1440 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988)).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
30 F.3d at 1440.
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1988)).
Id. at 1441.
Id.
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The decision in Deprizio by the Seventh Circuit is the leading case
holding that an avoided transfer is recoverable from the non-insider
transferee.72 Despite the controversy surrounding Deprizio, all circuit
courts addressing the issue, including the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits, followed the Seventh Circuit's lead.7 Without restating the
analysis of Deprizio,the Eleventh Circuit joined the unanimous support
of Deprizio at the circuit court level and affirmed the district court in
Wesley.74
It remains to be seen what, if any, impact the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994 will have on Deprizio-type preference actions in cases filed prior
to October 22, 1994. The authors note that the legislative history to
section 202 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which is the so-called
"Deprizio
fix," states that the amendment is a codification of pre-Code
75
law.

B. Fraudulent Transfers: Recovery from Debtor
Another question before the Eleventh Circuit in Coggin v. Coggin (In
re Coggin),7' was whether the trustee could recover a prepetition
fraudulent transfer from the debtor.77 Within one year of his bankruptcy filing, the debtor, Thomas E. Coggin, converted various assets to cash
and then transferred the sum of $13,000 to his son, Ibmmy.78 This
transfer was one basis for the bankruptcy court's denial of the debtor's
discharge under section 727(a)(2)(A), 79 which the district courts° and
Eleventh Circuit both affirmed.8 1 The Chapter 7 trustee also sought to
obtain a judgment against the debtor for $13,000, the amount of the

72. Id.
73. Id. at 1441 n.3 (citing Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Sufolla, Inc. v. U. S.
Nat'l Bank of Oregon (Inre Sufolla, Inc.), 2 F.3d 977,986 (9th Cir. 1993); Southmark Corp.
v. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc. (In re Southmark Corp.), 993 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.
1993); Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490, 1495 (6th Cir.
1990); Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank of Bethany (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 97 B.R.
77, 82 (W.D. Okla. 1988), aft'd, Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey (In re
Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989)).
74. Id. at 1441.
75. H. R. REP. No. 835, 103rd Cong., 2nd Seas. (1994). Despite this legislative history,
the bankruptcy court followed Wesley in Rosen v. Air Forwarding Systems (In re Air
Forwarding Systems), 176 B.R. 638, 639 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995), which was filed prior to
the effective date of the Bankrutpcy Reform Act of 1994.
76. 30 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
77. 30 F.3d at 1452-54.
78, Id. at 1451-52.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 727(aX2)(A) (1988).
80. 30 F.3d at 1446.
81. Id. at 1452.
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fraudulent transfer, but the bankruptcy court determined that "Section
550 does not authorize or permit recovery against a Debtor for the value
of property fraudulently transferred." 2
The Chapter 7 trustee's appeal of this adverse ruling, which the
district court affirmed,' presented a question of first impression to the
Eleventh Circuit."4 Section 550(a)(1)" provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a
transfer is avoided under section... 548... of this title, the trustee
may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or,
if the court so orders, the value of such property, from(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made."
The Eleventh Circuit found no cases deciding that the debtor, as
transferor, was the "entity for whose benefit such transfer was made"
within the meaning of section 550.s' Looking to the plain language of
the statute and its apparent purpose, the Eleventh Circuit held that
section 550(a)(1) does not permit recovery of a fraudulent transfer from
the debtor-transferor.' "[Tihere is no cause of action under section 550
for the value of an avoidable transfer against the transferring debtor as
an 'entity for whose benefit such transfer was made.'"89

82. Id. (quoting Bankruptcy Court Memorandum of Decision at 13).
83. Id. at 1446.
84. Id. at 1453.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 550(aXl) (1988).
86. 30 F.3d at 1453 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988)).
87. Id.
88. Id. In dicta, the Eleventh Circuit observed that the debtor may occasionally obtain
a direct benefit from an avoidable transfer. Id.
The debtor will usually receive a benefit in making an avoidable transfer in only
two situations. First, the debtor may benefit in the case of a fraudulent transfer
where the debtor retains an interest in the transferred assets, thereby protecting
some assets from the reach of the bankruptcy process and benefiting the debtor.
The second situation in which the debtor may benefit from an avoidable
conveyance arises when the conveyance is made to satisfy a nondischargeable
obligation, so that the debtor will receive his discharge with less post-discharge
obligations remaining.
Id. The authors question whether this dicta leaves any room for argument by the trustee
in the rare instance where the debtor receives a direct benefit from a fraudulent transfer.
89. Id. at 1454.
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IV. EXEmpTIONS: DUTY TO OBJECT
In Allen v. Green (In re Green)" the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
legal significance of a debtor's exemption of the entire, but contingent,
reported value of a tort claim resulting from an automobile accident."
The debtor, Louise I. Green, scheduled as an asset a "lawsuit from auto
accident" and stated its value as one dollar based on the contingent
aspect of the claim. The debtor listed the lawsuit on her schedule of
exemptions, where she also stated its value as one dollar.'
The
Chapter 7 trustee settled the lawsuit for $15,000 approximately one year
after the bankruptcy filing, which precipitated a dispute over the
settlement proceeds."
The bankruptcy court limited the debtor's exemption of the settlement
proceeds to one dollar, and the debtor appealed. The district court
reversed, holding that failing to object timely to the debtor's exemption
precluded the trustee's claim to the settlement proceeds.94 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court, ruling that the Supreme
Court's decision in Taylor v. Freeland& Kronz'5 was controlling. 6
Section 522(1)?7 of the Code establishes a debtor's right to claim
exemptions.9" Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b)" governs the time period for
objecting to the claim of exemptions."° In general, a trustee must file
objections within thirty days after the conclusion of the meeting of
creditors.'
The Supreme Court strictly construed the trustee's duty

90. 31 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 1098.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1099.
94. Id.
95. 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992).
96. 31 F.3d at 1100.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1988). This section provides, in relevant part: "(1) The debtor
shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this
section .... Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such
list is exempt." Id.
98. 31 F.3d at 1099 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1988)).
99. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). This rule provides, in relevant part:
(b) The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed
as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held
pursuant to Rule 2003(a) or the filing of any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules unless, within such period, further time is granted by the court ....
Id.
100. 31 F,3d at 1099-1100 (quoting FED. R. BANIR. P. 4003(b)).
101. Id
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to file a timely objection in Taylor.' The Eleventh Circuit deemed
the facts in Green to be legally indistinguishable from the facts in Taylor.'0 3

In Taylor the debtor also scheduled and claimed as exempt a lawsuit;
however, the lawsuit's value was stated as "unknown." 1' The lawsuit
eventually settled for $110,000, far in excess of the amount the debtor
should have been able to exempt."0 5 Nevertheless, the court permitted
the debtor to retain the entire settlement fund because the trustee did
not file a timely objection."° According to the Eleventh Circuit, an
unstated premise in Taylor was that "a debtor who exempts the entire
reported value of an asset is claiming the 'full amount,' whatever it
turns out to be.""° The factual similarity between Green and Taylor
is that the debtors in both cases exempted the full reported value of
0
their respective lawsuits."
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that its decision was contrary to
Addison v. Reavis, °9 a district court opinion. In Addison the debtor
tried to exempt an entire homestead based on an exemption claim of one
dollar, but the district court distinguished Taylor."' The district court
in Addison reasoned, for a debtor to use a nominal valuation "in an
attempt to completely exempt an asset or group of assets worth well over
the statutory maximum is inappropriate.""' As far as practitioners in
the Eleventh Circuit are concerned, however, Green, not Addison, is the
law.
Green serves as a reminder that a trustee must be vigilant in timely
reviewing and, if necessary, objecting to the exemption of an asset with
a contingent or undetermined value. Unless the trustee can prove that
the debtor's valuation was misleading, the failure to strictly adhere to
Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) will likely result in a windfall to the debtor, to
the detriment of the bankruptcy estate, if the asset turns out to be
valuable. Debtors and their counsel must use caution when claiming

102. Id. at 1100 (citing Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1647-49).

103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 421 (3d Cir. 1991)).
105. Id. (citing Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1647).
106. Id. (citing Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1647-49).

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 158 B.R. 53 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd sub nom Ainslie v. Grablowsky, 32 F.3d 562 (4th
Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished summary affirmance).
110. 31 F.3d at 1100-01 (quoting Addison, 158 B.R. at 59).
111. Id. at 1101 (quoting Addison, 158 B.R. at 57).
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exemptions, however, because sanctions exist for exemptions that are
fraudulent or filed in bad faith. 112
V. LIEN AVOIDANCE
The Eleventh Circuit denied a debtor's attempt to avoid a judgment
lien in Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn)." American Cast Iron Pipe Co. ("ACIPCO") obtained a judgment against the
debtor, Peter Wrenn, in the amount of $20,480. ACIPCO recorded the
judgment in Jefferson County, Alabama, where the debtor owned his
house and another parcel of real property. After ACIPCO initiated a
garnishment action to enforce its judgment, the debtor filed a Chapter
"4
7 petition listing one creditor and one asset, the house.
After the debtor received his discharge and the Chapter 7 case was
closed, the bankruptcy court granted the debtor's motion to reopen the
case.1 5 The debtor moved to avoid ACIPCO's judgment lien to the
extent it impaired his $5,000 homestead exemption under Alabama
law.118 The bankruptcy court granted the lien avoidance motion, but
only to the extent of $5,000, and the debtor appealed.1 7 The district
court reversed, voiding the judgment lien in its entirety.1 Pursuant
to ACIPCO's appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and reinstated the
bankruptcy court's order. 9
First, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the debtor's argument that the
judgment lien was unenforceable as a result of the discharge in
bankruptcy. 2 ' Quoting section 524(a)(1), 2 1 the court stated that "[a]
discharge in bankruptcy 'voids any judgment ... , to the extent such
122
judgment is a determination of personal liability of the debtor.'
Prepetition liens, therefore, remain enforceable after the discharge."2
The debtor argued that his entitlement to a fresh start dictated that any
postdischarge increase in equity in the house accrue to his benefit. 24
This argument failed to persuade the Eleventh Circuit:

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. (quoting Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1648-49).
40 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1163-64.
Id. at 1164.

116.

Id.; ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (1975).

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

40 F.3d at 1164.
Id.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1164-65.
11 U.S.C. § 524((a)(1) (1988).
40 F.3d at 1164 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(aX1) (1988)).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1165 n.4.
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However important the fresh start may be as a justification for the
rights debtors enjoy under the Code, by itself it cannot disturb statelaw property rights ...ACIPCO's lien remains valid. Without an
explicit fresh start section of the Bankruptcy Code to invalidate it, the
lien is valid even if its existence violates the fresh start principle. We
therefore conclude that the fresh start principle is not an adequate
basis for avoiding the judicial lien."2
Second, the debtor argued that the judgment lien was avoidable in its
The debtor, however, failed to present
entirety under section 506(d).'
this argument clearly to the court.1" 7 The Eleventh Circuit understood
the debtor to argue that the judgment lien was avoided under section
506(d) on the ground that the court disallowed ACIPCO's claim.lss In
other words, instead of asserting that the judgment lien should have
been reduced to the judicially determined value of the house, the debtor
merely recast his contention that the discharge resulted in disallowance
of ACIPCO's claim."m The flaw in the debtor's analysis is that the
debtor did not object to ACIPCO's claim, thus the court allowed the
claim. 3 0
"Section 506(d) does not avoid liens securing allowed

claims."13 1
Third, the debtor argued that the judgment lien was avoidable under
section 522(0.12 Indeed, this section was applicable, but not to the
degree the debtor advocated. Under section 522(b),' in conjunction
with Alabama law,'" the debtor was authorized to claim a $5,000

125. Id.
126. Id. at 1165; 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988). This section provides, in relevant part: "To
the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured
claim, such lien is void...." 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
127. 40 F.3d at 1165.
128. Id. at 1166.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988)). This section provides, in relevant part:
"A claim ...is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest.., objects." 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)
(1988).
131. 40 F.3d at 1166.
132. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988). This section provides, in relevant part:
(f)Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing
of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien
impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under
subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is (1) a judicial lien ....
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).

133. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
134. ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (1975).
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homestead exemption.' 35 Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in City
National Bank v. Chabot (In re Chabot),' 6 the Eleventh Circuit

"reasoned that the plain meaning of the language of § 522(f) limits its
lien avoidance to the value of the exemptions provided in § 522(b)."137
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated the bankruptcy court's order
that the debtor could avoid the judgment lien only to the extent of the
$5,000 homestead exemption. 138

Note, however, that Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
19949 added language to the Code denoted as section 522(f)(2) 14 to
clarify when a lien impairs an exemption. The legislative history 141 to

this amendment expressly rejects the decision in Chabot by the Ninth
Circuit on which the Eleventh Circuit relied on Wrenn. 42 The authors
suggest, therefore, that Wrenn's holding under section 522(f) 43 is not
applicable in cases filed on or after October 22, 1994, the effective date
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.'"
VI.

EXECUTORY CONTRACTS: ASSUMPTION OF CABLE TELEVISION
FRANCHISE AGREEMENT

The question presented in City ofJamestown v. James CablePartners,
L.P. (In re James Cable Partners, L.P) was whether the debtor,

James Cable Partners; L.P., could assume a cable television franchise
agreement notwithstanding the objection of the City of Jamestown
("Jamestown"), the franchisor, and a city ordinance prohibiting
assignment of the franchise agreement.'
The bankruptcy court,
district court, and Eleventh Circuit all held that the debtor could assume
the franchise agreement. 4"
The debtor was the second assignee of a cable television franchise
Jamestown granted; Jamestown consented to both assignments. The
debtor paid $1.5 million for the assignment and expended approximately
$500,000 on improvements to the cable system. In June, 1991, the

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

40 F.3d at 1166.
992 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1993).
40 F.3d at 1166 (citing Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895).
Id.
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 303, 108 Stat. 4016 (1994).
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
H.R. Rep. No. 835, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994).
40 F.3d at 1166 (citing Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895).
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 702, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
27 F.3d at 534 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 535.
Id. at 536, 539.
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debtor sought relief under Chapter 11, and the debtor's plan of
reorganization proposed to assume the franchise agreement."
Jamestown objected to the assumption of the franchise agreement based
upon the city ordinance that states, in relevant part:
The rights and privileges herein granted shall not be assignable nor
transferrable in any bankruptcy proceedings, trusteeship, receivership
or by operation of any law, and in the event of such assignment or
transfer, this grant shall terminate forthwith, nor shall said company
sell, lease, assign, or otherwise alienate this grant or any privilege
hereunder without the prior approval of the Board of Mayor and
Aldermen.149
Jamestown's objection, however, was uniformly unsuccessful. 6 '
The pertinent statutory provisions the Eleventh Circuit analyzed were
sections 365(a),15' 365(c)(1),"6 2 and 365(f)(1)' of the Code. Section
365(a) sets forth the general rule that a debtor in possession may
assume any executory contract.'" The legal ground for Jamestown's
objection was section 365(c)(1), which provides, in relevant part:
(c) The trustee (read debtor in possession] may not assume or assign
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not
such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or
delegation of duties, if(1) (A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in
possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment
155

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 536.
Id. (quoting City Ordinance No. 1 3-1-77).
Id. at 536, 539.
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).

152. id. § 365(c)(1).

153. 27 F.3d at 537-38; 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
154. 27 F.3d at 537 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988)).

This section states that

"[eixcept as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d)
of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any

executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
155. 27 F.3d at 537 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (1988)).
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Section 365(f)(1) states the general rule that a debtor in possession may
assign an executory contract, subject to the limitation of section
365(c).' "
There was no dispute that Jamestown did not consent to the debtor's
assumption of the cable television franchise, thereby satisfying
subsection (B) of section 365(c)(1). 157 The controversy, therefore,
revolved around subsection (A) of section 365(c)(1).'" Jamestown
argued that the ordinance constituted "applicable law" excusing it from
accepting performance from an entity other than the debtor."9 The
Eleventh Circuit employed two rules of statutory interpretation to reject
Jamestown's argument, first looking at the plain meaning of the
statute, 16° and second construing the statute to give effect to each of
its provisions.1 6'
Determining that Jamestown's argument would render subsection
365(f) superfluous, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned:
Subsection (f) states that "applicable law" prohibiting assignment of an
executory contract does not bar assignment of an executory contract by
a trustee (or debtor in possession). Thus, the "applicable law" to which
subsection (c) refers must mean "applicable law" other than general
prohibitions barring assignment. The "applicable law" to which both
subsections refer is obviously non-bankruptcy law .... In order to be
excused from accepting performance, the city would need to point to
"applicable law" such as a Tennessee law that renders performance
under the cable franchise agreement nondelegable."'
Since Jamestown proffered no Tennessee law aside from the ordinance,
the exception found in subsection 365(c)(1) was not applicable to prevent
the debtor from assuming the cable television franchise agreement."

156. Id. at 538 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(0(1) (1988)). This section states that "[eixcept
as provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwithstanding a provision in an executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or
conditions the assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract
or lease." 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
157. 27 F.3d at 537.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 536-38.
Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 538 (footnotes omitted).

163.

Id.
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ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES: INTEREST ON POSTPETITION TRADE
DEBT

The Eleventh Circuit determined in Varsity Carpet Services, Inc. v.
Richardson (In re Colortex Industries, Inc.)'" that interest on trade
debt incurred during a Chapter 11 case may be treated as an adminisFollowing convertrative expense through the date of conversion.'
only as a fifth
is
payable
trade
debt
11
the
Chapter
on
sion, interest
1 of the Code."8 7
726(a)(5)'
section
priority under
The debtor, Colortex Industries, Inc., filed a Chapter 11 petition on
October 24, 1989. Three companies, Varsity Carpet Services, Inc.
("Varsity"), Textile Coating, Ltd. ("Textile"), and Chem-Tech Finishers,
Inc. ("Chem-Tech"), provided carpet finishing services to the debtor on
a credit basis between October 26, 1989, and February 1, 1990. The
bankruptcy court subsequently converted the case to Chapter 7 on April
17, 1990.16 On March 2, 1992, Varsity, Textile, and Chem-Tech filed
a motion for immediate payment of their postpetition claims, including
interest to date. 69 The Chapter 7 trustee filed an objection to the
motion. 70

The bankruptcy court denied the request for interest on the postpetition claims.17 ' On appeal the district court reversed, allowing interest
on the trade debt as an administrative expense, but only to the date of
conversion. 72 The three trade creditors appealed the denial of interest
as an administrative expense following conversion, and the trustee crossappealed the award of interest as an administrative expense to the date
of conversion. 173 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
conclusion. 74
Section 726175 governs distribution of the estate in a Chapter 7

164. 19 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1994).
165. Id. at 1384.
166. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (1988).
167. 19 F.3d at 1384.
168. Id. at 1373.
169. Id. Varsity, Textile, and Chem-Tech held administrative claims in the principal
amounts of $29,214.57, $11,583.55, and $3,782.82, respectively. Id. at 1374 n.1.
170. Id. at 1373.
171. Id. at 1374.
172. Id. (citing Varsity Carpet Serve., Inc. v. Richardson, 146 B.R. 881, 887 (N.D. Ga.
1992)).

173. Id.
174. Id.
175.

11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988). This section provides, in relevant part:
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liquidation and provides that payments are to be made first according
to the priorities of section 507.176 Section 507,7 in turn, gives first
priority to administrative expenses under section 503(b).7 8 Section
503(b)17 includes in administrative expenses "the actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate . . . ."" "No provision of
the Code specifically provides for the payment of interest on administrative expenses.""' Rather, the right to recover interest as an administrative expense must be derived from the use of the term "including" in
section 503(b)(1).1 82
The Eleventh Circuit surveyed the case law dealing with interest as
an administrative expense under the Code and found little guidance."s
The Eleventh Circuit also reviewed the case law decided under the
Bankruptcy Act."' The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the decision
of the Supreme Court in Nicholas v. United States," holding that
interest on a postpetition tax liability should be accorded priority under
the Bankruptcy Act, was analogous.ss

(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be
distributed(1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in the order
specified in, section 507 of this title;...
(5) fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of
the petition, on any claim paid under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this
subsection ....
Id.
176. 19 F.3d at 1376 (quoting 11.U.S.C. § 726(aX1) (1988)).
177. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). This section provides, in relevant part: "(a) The following
expenses and claims have priority in the following order: (1) First, administrative expenses
allowed under section 503(b) of this title, and any fees and charges assessed against the
estate under chapter 123 of title 28. ..

."

Id.

178. 19 F.3d at 1376 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988)).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1988). This section provides, in relevant part: "(b) After
notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses, other than claims
allowed under section 502(f) of this title, including- (1) (A) the actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services
rendered after the commencement of the case .... " Id.
180. 19 F.3d at 1376 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1988)).
181. Id.
182, Id. at 1377.
183, Id. at 1377-78.
184. Id. at 1380-81.
185. 384 U.S. 678 (1966). The Eleventh Circuit previously adopted the rationale of
Nicholas with respect to interest on postpetition tax claims under the Code in United
States v. Cranshaw (Inre Allied Mechanical Serv., Inc.), 885 F.2d 837 (11th Cir. 1989). 19
F.3d at 1375.
186. 19 F.3d at 1381, 1383.
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The Supreme Court in Nicholas conceded the wisdom of suspending
interest on prepetition claims.'8 7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
"declined to treat identically interest on claims arising prepetition and
those arising postpetition during a period of arrangement.""' Addressing the effect of an intervening liquidation on the treatment of interest
on postpetition claims, the Supreme Court stated that "the accumulation
of interest on a debt must be suspended once an enterprise enters a
period of bankruptcy administration beyond that in which the underlying interest-bearing obligation was incurred." 8 9
A policy justification set forth in Nicholas was that denial of interest
on the postpetition tax claims might hinder the availability of credit and
restrict the debtor's prospects for rehabilitation. 9 0 "This policy applies
with equal, if not greater, force in the context of trade debts." 9" In
accordance with this policy, the Eleventh Circuit summarized its
conclusion as follows:
In summary, because the language of the Code is silent, and the
statute and legislative history indicate no clear intent to abrogate prior
law, we look to the prior law. As indicated in the foregoing discussion,
we conclude that the most reasonable reading of the prior law is that
the priority accorded to interest on trade debts incurred as administrative expenses during Chapter 11 should be determined pursuant to the
Nicholas rationale. Accordingly, we hold that interest on trade debts
incurred as administrative expenses during Chapter 11 enjoys the
same priority as the administrative expense itself, but that upon
conversion to Chapter 7, the interest accruing thereafter enjoys only
the fifth priority pursuant to § 726(a)(5).92
VIII. CHAPTER 13: POSTCONFIRMATION DEFAULT
The Eleventh Circuit ruled in Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Hoggle (In
re Hoggle)'93 that a confirmed Chapter 13 plan may be modified to
allow the debtor to cure a postconfirmation default on a debt secured by
the debtor's principal residence.194 This ruling is significant, because
preserving the debtor's house is often the primary objective of a Chapter

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1381 (quoting Nicholas, 384 U.S. at 683).
Id. (quoting Nicholas, 384 U.S. at 684-85).
Id. (quoting Nicholas, 384 U.S. at 685).
Id. at 1382 (quoting Nicholas, 384 U.S. at 687).

191. Id.
192. Id. at 1384.

193. 12 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 1994).
194. Id, at 1012.
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13 filing and financial disruptions are common during the postconfirmation phase.
In three separate Chapter 13 cases, the bankruptcy court approved
modifications to cure postpetition defaults and denied motions for relief
from stay filed by Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. ("Green Tree"), which
held purchase money security interests in the debtors' mobile homes."'5
Green Tree appealed to the district court, contending that these
96
postconfirmation modifications were prohibited as a matter of law.'
The district court consolidated the appeals and affirmed."9 7
The relevant statutory provisions are section 1322(b)' and section
1329' 9 of the Code.'
Section 1322(b)(2) authorizes the debtor to
modify the rights of secured creditors but creates "a specific 'no

195. Id. at 1008-09.
196. Id. at 1009.
197. Id. at 1008-09. Because Green Tree disavowed any claim that the bankruptcy
court abused its discretion in permitting the postconfirmation modifications, the Eleventh
Circuit did not develop the particular circumstances of each case. Id. at 1009 n.1.
198. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1988). This section provides, in relevant part:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may-...
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence,
or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of
unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims;
(3) provide for the curing or waiving of any default;...
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the curing of
any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case
is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is
due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due.
Id.
199. 11 U.S.C. § 1329 (1988). This section provides, in relevant part:
(a) At any time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of
payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of the debtor,
the trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class
provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments;
or
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided
for by the plan to the extent necessary to take account of any payment of such
claim other than under the plan.
(b) (1) Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of this title and the requirements
of section 1325(a) of this title apply to any modification under subsection (a) of this
section.
(2) The plan as modified becomes the plan unless, after notice and a hearing,
such modification is disapproved.
Id.
200. 12 F.3d at 1009.
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modification' exception for holders of claims secured only by a lien on the
debtor's principal residence." °1
Notwithstanding this exception,
section 1322(b)(5) states that a plan may provide for the curing of any
default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments during
the life of the plan.'
Under section 1329, the debtor may modify the
plan after confirmation, provided that the plan, as amended, complies
with section 13 2 2 .* Green Tree argued that postconfirmation modification was impermissible in these cases because the original plans could
not have provided for the cure of postpetition defaults. 4
Green Tree's logic did not persuade the Eleventh Circuit. Instead, the
court applied the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construction and
found the language of section 1322(b)(5) to be dispositive. 2 5 The
Eleventh Circuit buttressed its conclusion with an interpretation of the
general legislative intent behind Chapter 13'° and the specific legislative history of sections 1322(b)(5) and 1329. 2"
Of course this interpretation of the Code, permitting the cure of
postconfirmation defaults, does not leave home mortgage lenders without
rights to enforce confirmed Chapter 13 plans. The lenders have an
opportunity to be heard in connection with postconfirmation modifica2
tions, and the modifications must comport with section 1322(b)(5). 08
As the Eleventh Circuit noted, "[tihe Bankruptcy Court possesses ample
powers to prevent successive or abusive attempted modifications.' 2°9

201. Id. at 1010 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX2) (1988)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1009.
204. Id. at 1009-10.
205. Id. at 1010.
Section 1322(bX5) clearly states that a plan may provide for the curing of any
default. Congress could have easily inserted the word prepetition to modify
default but failed to do so. The omission is significant. The plain meaning of
§ 1322(b)(5) permits cure of any default whether occurring prior to the filing of the
petition or subsequent to confirmation of the plan. Thus, § 1322(b)(5) would
permit the cure of postconfirmation defaults.
Id. (emphasis in original).
206. Id. "Accordingly, permitting cure of postconfirmation defaults best accords with
Congressional intent to permit homeowners to utilize its flexible provisions for debt relief
without sacrificing their homes." Id.
207. Id. at 1011. "Thus, the general legislative intent surrounding Chapter 13 as well
as specific legislative history relating to § 1322(b)(5) and § 1329 suggests that default,
either preconfirmation or postconfirmation, may be cured under appropriate circumstances." Id.
208. Id. at 1012.
209. Id. at 1011-12.
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ATTORNEY FEES

A

Conflict of Interest
As a result of conflicts of interest the court characterized as egregious,
the Eleventh Circuit in Electro-Wire Products,Inc. v. Sirote & Permutt,
P.C. (In re Prince)210 denied all fees and expenses requested by the

debtor's counsel. Although the bankruptcy court awarded the law firm,
Sirote & Permutt, P.C. ("Sirote"), $98,589.42, and the district court
increased the award to $199,293.52,211 the Eleventh Circuit reversed
in a strongly worded opinion.21
The debtor, William L. Prince, filed a Chapter 11 petition on
November 28, 1989. At that time Jack Caddell, an attorney who had no
affiliation with Sirote, represented Mr. Prince. Mr. Caddell moved to
withdraw from the case in March 1990, and the bankruptcy court
approved the employment of Sirote as the debtor's counsel on April 23,
1990.213 Sirote withdrew from the case on October 22, 1991, and filed
a final fee application on March 6, 1992.214
The facts giving rise to the conflict of interest were as follows: In
August 1986, Sirote began performing estate planning services for Mr.
Prince and his wife, Clara Inez Prince. In September 1986, Sirote
initiated a divorce case for Prince that was dismissed in April 1989 after
the Princes reconciled.215 In 1988 Sirote performed corporate work for
PBR Electronics, Inc., a corporation Mr. Prince operated and controlled.
In June 1989, the estate planning work resumed,. and Mr. Prince
transferred approximately $600,000 in property to Mrs. Prince for no
valuable consideration. Sirote recorded the deeds on October 17, 1989
and billed Mr. Prince $212.86.216 Of the $7,381.77 owed to Sirote for
the initial estate planning work, Mr. Prince paid $5,056.40 within ninety
days of his bankruptcy filing, and he paid the recording fee of $218.86
in December 1989, shortly after his bankruptcy filing. During Mr.
Prince's Chapter 11 case, Sirote represented Mrs. Prince in a suit by
Electro-Wire Products, Inc. ("Electro") to enforce a personal guaran17
2

ty.

210. 40 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994).
211.

Id. at 359.

212. Id. at 361-62.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 358-59.
at 359.
at 358.
at 359.
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In connection with the application for employment as counsel for the
debtor, Robert B. Rubin, the head of Sirote's bankruptcy department,
submitted a boilerplate affidavit stating that the law firm had no
disqualifying interests. 18 The Eleventh Circuit found the affidavit to
be grossly deficient,21 even after two amendments." 0 Electro was
the creditor that objected to Sirote's final fee application and brought the
appeals to the Eleventh Circuit. Unlike the lower courts, the Eleventh
Circuit sharply criticized Sirote. 2 1
The Eleventh Circuit first outlined the general parameters for
reviewing a fee award under the abuse of discretion standard.222 "[A]
bankruptcy judge's discretion in awarding compensation for services
2
performed during bankruptcy proceedings deserves great deference. " 0
Section 328(c)m4 permits, but does not require, denial of fees for
professionals found not to be disinterested." Despite its approval of
a commentator's statement that denial of fees should not be rigidly
applied in the absence of actual injury or prejudice to the bankruptcy
estate,226 the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Tenth Circuit's sanction
for conflicts of interest.27 The Tenth Circuit stated that "iln exercising the discretion granted by the statute we think the [bankruptcy] court

218. Id. at 358.
219. Id. at 359.
Neither the application for employment nor Rubin's affidavit reflected Sirote's
representation of the Debtor, his spouse, or his corporation; Sirote's participation
in the transfer of $600,000 of the Debtor's assets to his wife; Sirote's receipt of
$5,056.40 in payment of an antecedent debt during the 90-day period preceding
the Debtor's bankruptcy filing;, or Sirote's receipt of payment of the $212.86
prepetition debt after the filing of the Debtor's Chapter 11 case.
Id.
220. Id. at 361.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 359 (citing Holywell Corp. v. Smith (Inre Holywell Corp.), 967 F.2d 568,571
(11th Cir. 1992)).
223. Id. (citingHolywell, 967 F.2d at 571; Hatcher v. Miller (In re Red Carpet Corp. of
Panama City Beach), 902 F.2d 883, 890 (11th Cir. 1990)).
224. 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (1988). This section provides:
Except as provided in section 327(c), 327(e), or 1107(b) of this title, the court may
deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses of a
professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title if, at any time
during such professional person's employment under section 327 or 1103 of this
title, such professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds
an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on
which such professional person is employed.
Id.
225. 40 F.3d at 359-60 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (1988)).
226. Id. at 360 (quoting 2 COLWER ON BANKRupTcy 328.04, (15th ed. 1994)).
227. Gray v. English, 30 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1994).
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should lean strongly toward denial of fees, and if the past benefit to the
wrongdoer fiduciary can be quantified, to require disgorgement of
compensation previously paid that fiduciary even before the conflict
arose."n
The Eleventh Circuit next focused on whether actual prejudice
occurred in the case at bar.'
The leading case is Woods v. City
National Bank & TRust Co.," ° in which the Supreme Court stated,
"Where an actual conflict of interest exists, no more need be shown in
this type of case to support a denial of compensation." 1 The Supreme
Court added, "Where a claimant, who represented members of the
investing public, was serving more than one master or was subject to
conflicting interests, he should be denied compensation. It is no answer
to say that fraud or unfairness were [sic] not shown to have resulted."'
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's guidance, the Eleventh
Circuit determined that "Itihe accurate measure of prejudice here is not
what Sirote actually did or did not do in handling Prince's case, but
rather whether Sirote could have unbiasedly made decisions in the best
interest of its client."28
In denying Sirote's fees and expenses, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Sirote could not represent the bankruptcy estate without bias.'
Under these circumstances, the lower courts abused their discretion
in awarding compensation to Sirote.' "A finding that Sirote qualifies
for fees in this case would render the impartiality requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code meaningless.
It did not matter whether Sirote's
228. 40 F.3d at 360 (quoting Gray, 30 F.3d at 1324)).
229. Id. at 360.
230. 312 U.S. 262 (1940).
231. 40 F.3d at 360 (quoting Woods, 312 U.S. at 268).

232. Id. at 361 (quoting Woods, 312 U.S. at 268).
233. Id. at 360.
234. Id.
The egregious facts of this case demonstrate that the conflicts of interest which
Sirote labored under clearly prejudiced the Debtor's estate. By representing
Prince in his bankruptcy proceedings, Sirote deprived Prince of a conflict-free,
impartial, independent evaluation of the potential claims of and against his estate.
The most obvious prejudice to the Debtor is Sirote's inability to independently
evaluate the $600,000 property transaction between Prince and Mrs. Prince and
its possible effect of Prince's estate. Whether a conflict-free bankruptcy lawyer
would have attacked the transaction as a fraudulent conveyance is impossible for
us to know.
Id.
235. Id. at 361.
236. Id. Section 327(a), which governs the employment of professionals in bankruptcy
cases, is designed "to ensure impartiality in bankruptcy representation.' Id. at 360 (citing
In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815, 826-27 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985)); 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1988)).
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failure to disclose the conflicts was inadvertent or intentional. 7 The
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the harshness of a complete denial of
fees and expenses, but justified this sanction on the grounds of deterring
future wrongdoing by Sirote and warning others who might consider
similar defalcations.'
The readers of this Article should consider
themselves duly warned.
B. InterpleaderAction
The issue in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Mandalay Shores Co-op.
Housing Ass'n, Inc. (In re Mandalay Shores Co-op. Housing Ass'n,
Inc.) 9 was whether a bank may recover attorney fees for filing an
interpleader action as a putative innocent stakeholder. The bankruptcy
court and district court both denied the bank's fee application,240 but
the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the lower
courts applied the incorrect legal standard. 1
The tenants of Mandalay Shores, an apartment complex in Clearwater, Florida, incorporated under the name of Mandalay Shores Cooperative Housing Association, Inc. ("Mandalay"), for the purpose of buying
the apartment complex from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development.
Each tenant contributed approximately $3,200 to
Mandalay, which deposited more than $1 million with Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A. ("Chase"). After the original deal collapsed, the tenants
formed two antagonistic groups, litigation ensued, and Mandalay filed
a series of three Chapter 11 petitions.'2
At the time of the last bankruptcy filing, Mandalay's primary
scheduled asset was the account with Chase, which had grown to more
than $1.5 million.'
The bankruptcy court appointed a Chapter 11
trustee, who filed an adversary proceeding against Chase to recover the
funds in the account.'
Meanwhile, two tenants were claiming, in a
separate federal action, that the funds were held in a charitable trust on
behalf of the tenants and thus were not property of the bankruptcy
estate. Chase filed a third-party complaint in interpleader in the

Sirote was not a "distinterested person" within the meaning of section 327(a) or section
101(14), 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (1988). 40 F.3d at 360.
237. 40 F.3d at 359-60.
238. Id. at 360 (quoting Gray, 30 F.3d at 1323).
239. 21 F.3d 380 (11th Cir. 1994).
240. Id. at 381.
241. Id. at 383-84.
242. Id. at 381.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 381-82.
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adversary proceeding."45 The separate federal action by the two
tenants was eventually dismissed, as was the Chapter 11 case,
which
24
left the adversary proceeding as the only remaining litigation.
As part of the dismissal of the Chapter 11 case, the bankruptcy court
directed all professionals to file fee applications. 7 Chase filed a fee
application for the legal cost of the bankruptcy case as well as the
adversary proceeding and the separate federal action. The bankruptcy
court denied Chase's fee application in a forty-six line order, holding that
Chase's involvement in the interpleader action was a noncompensable
cost of doing business.' 4 Chase moved for a rehearing, which the
bankruptcy court denied. 9 Chase appealed to the district court, but
the district court adopted the bankruptcy court's conclusion.'°
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the court applied the abuse of
discretion standard of review, stating that "[ilt is axiomatic that an
award of attorneys' fees and costs in an interpleader action in bankruptcy is an equitable matter that lies within the sound discretion of the
bankruptcy court."25' The Eleventh Circuit determined that the lower
courts applied an improper legal standard by ruling 2that
banks
52
universally may not be compensated for interpleader suits.

The reasons for awarding attorney fees in an interpleader action are
that the interpleader action often promotes efficiency by eliminating
piecemeal litigation, the stakeholder is often innocent of provoking the
dispute, and the fees are typically minor in relation to the value of the
asset.253 Nevertheless, when interpleader actions are brought with
regularity and the costs can be allocated to customers, attorney fees may
2
2
be denied as a normal business expense. "

Insurance companies,

and sometimes banks, typically encounter this situation.

11

6

245. Id. at 382.
246. Id.
247.

Id.

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.

251. Id. at 382-83 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 781 F.2d 1494, 1497 (11th Cir.
1986)). Abuse of discretion occurs when a court applies an improper legal standard or
makes factual findings that are clearly erroneous. Id. at 383.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. (citing Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Baton Rouge Bank & Trust Co., 537 F.
Supp. 1147, 1150-51 (M.D. Ga. 1982); Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gustafson, 415 F.
Supp. 615, 619 (N.D. Ill.
1976)).
256. Id. (citing In re Jones, 61 B.R. 48, 54 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986)).
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The Eleventh Circuit differentiated a bank's role as trustee of an
estate, where competing claims are foreseeable, from a bank's role as a
depository, where there is little expectation of a dispute concerning
ownership. 7 In the latter scenario, the Eleventh Circuit suggested
that an award of attorney fees to the bank may be appropriate. 2'
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration
of Chase's fee application pursuant to the court's delineation of the
proper legal standard. 9
X.

SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION:

JOINT CASES

In Reider v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (In re Reider),2 ° the
Eleventh Circuit formulated the standard for substantive consolidation
of bankruptcy estates of debtors who are spouses. 1 The bankruptcy
court ordered substantive consolidation of the estates of James and Ida
Reider, and the district court affirmed.262 The Eleventh Circuit
reversed, however, holding that the district court abused its discretion.2 The district court applied the incorrect legal standard, and the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the factual record did not justify
substantive consolidation.'"
The debtors owned Clermont Farms, Inc. ("Clermont"), which operated
a horse-breeding business on land Mrs. Reider inherited from her
mother.2" After Clermont's primary stud died and an attempt to
purchase a replacement failed, the Reiders filed a joint Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court later converted the case to
Chapter 7.'
The Chapter 7 trustee sold the farm for $400,000, and Mr. Reider
attempted to claim an exemption in the proceeds. The bankruptcy court
rejected the exemption by Mr. Reider, finding that the farm was titled
solely in the name of Mrs. Reider.' 7 In the course of the exemption
dispute, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), as
successor to Florida Center Bank, raised the issue of substantive
consolidation. The FDIC was owed $320,978.58 on a loan to Clermont
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 383-84.
31 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 1105.
Id.
Id. at 1103-04.
Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1104,
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that Mr. Reider personally guaranteed, but the FDIC did not have a
claim against Mrs. Reider.'
The lower courts based substantive consolidation on several factors:
(a) Mr. Reider listed the farm as an asset on the personal financial
statement he gave Florida Center Bank; (b) the Reiders filed a joint
bankruptcy case; (c) the bankruptcy schedules did not separate the
assets and liabilities of each estate; (d) the trustee intermingled proceeds
of the two estates; and (e) representations by the Reiders' counsel
After
inferred that the assets and liabilities were held jointly.'
establishing the correct legal standard for substantive consolidation,7
the Eleventh Circuit rejected these factors as a basis for substantive
consolidation in the case at bar."'
A bankruptcy court has equitable discretion to order substantive
consolidation of cases involving two related debtors pursuant to section
302(b). 2 However, the Code and Bankruptcy Rules offer no guidance
as to when substantive consolidation is appropriate.27 After discussing the origin of substantive consolidation in the corporate context,
distilling the corporate consolidation cases," 5 and analyzing the
published decisions involving substantive consolidation of the estates of
debtor spouses, the Eleventh Circuit laid down the following test: "In
assessing the propriety of substantive consolidation, a court must
determine: (1) whether there is a substantial identity between the
assets, liabilities, and handling of financial affairs between the debtor

268. Id.
269. Id. at 1109-10.
270. Id. at 1108-09.
271. Id. at 1109-12.
272. 11 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1988); 31 F.3d at 1104 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1988) and
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b)). Section 302(b) states that "[after the commencement of ajoint
case, the court shall determine the extent, if any, to which the debtors' estates shall be
consolidated." 11 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1988). Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) provides, in relevant
part:
(b) If a joint petition or two or more petitions are pending in the same court
by or against (1) a husband and wife, or (2) a partnership and one or more of its
general partners, or (3) two or more general partners, or (4) a debtor and an
affiliate, the court may order a joint administration of the estates. Prior to
entering an order the court shall give consideration to protecting creditors of
different estates against potential conflicts of interest.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b).
273. 31 F.3d at 1105.
274. Id. at 1105-07.
275. Id. at 1107-08.
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spouses; and (2) whether harm will result from permitting or denying
consolidation. 278
In terms of applying this test, the Eleventh Circuit added:
In assessing the extent of substantial identity, relevant factors will
include the extent ofjointly held property and the amount ofjoint-owed
debts. Upon a determination of substantial identity, the court must
then analyze the harm attendant to a failure to consolidate. Where
administrative difficulties in disentangling the spouses' estates makes
it prohibitively expensive or where disentanglement is otherwise
impracticable, consolidation should ordinarily be permitted. A creditor
may also demonstrate that it will be unfairly prejudiced by a failure to
consolidate and may interpose the fraud or bad faith of the debtors as
a defense. To prevent consolidation, a creditor may demonstrate that
it has relied on the separate credit and assets of one of the spouses and
would be harmed by a consolidation of assets. The burden is upon the
proponent of a motion for consolidation and is exacting. Ultimately,
the court must be persuaded that "the creditors will suffer greater
prejudice in the absence of consolidation than the debtors (and any
objecting creditors) will suffer from its imposition." Substantive
consolidation should be invoked 'sparingly' where any creditor or debtor
objects to its use.27
The lower courts erred in the application of the Eleventh Circuit's
test.278 There was not a substantial identity of the Reiders' estates, 279 nor was there a showing that harm would result from denying
consolidation.' The lower courts placed "undue reliance upon the fact
that the debtor spouses' estates had been jointly administered." 1
Instead, the lower courts should have focused on the manner in which
the Reiders conducted their business. 2
The Eleventh Circuit noted that precedents are of limited value in the
area of substantive consolidation because the cases are fact-specific.' 3
Nevertheless, Reider is significant for establishing the legal framework
for substantive consolidation in the spousal context.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1108-09 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1109-12.
Id. at 1109-10.
Id. at 1110-12.
Id. at 1109.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1108.
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BANKRUPTCY FRAUD: INTERPRETATION OF SENTENCING
GUIDELINES

The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the federal sentencing guidelines as
applied to bankruptcy fraud in United States v. Bellew. 2 4 The defendant, Phillip H. Bellew, filed a petition under Chapter 11, but during the
bankruptcy proceedings he failed to disclose assets worth $179,664.
After the concealment was uncovered, the defendant pleaded guilty to
two counts of bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152."s The
question presented to the Eleventh Circuit was whether the defendant's
sentencing range should be increased by two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2F1.1(b)(3)(B)."
The plea agreement left open the applicable sentencing range. 7
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(B) requires a two-level increase in the sentencing
range when the offense involves "violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree or process . -. .'s
The government
argued for the two-level increase,' but the defendant countered that
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(B) was not applicable because he had not violated
a specific court order.2 ° The district court ruled in favor of the
government,"' and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 2
The Eleventh Circuit observed that the Bankruptcy Rules and Official
Forms were promulgated by order of the Supreme Court dated April 25,
1983. 293 "[T]he Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms repeatedly
mandate that a debtor disclose assets and liabilities and that these
disclosures be truthful.' 4 Broadly reading the word "order' according
to its Black's Law Dictionary definition, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that concealment of assets in a bankruptcy proceeding constitutes a
violation of a "judicial order" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(B).'
The Eighth Circuit previously reached the same conclusion
on this specific issue.'

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

35 F.3d 518 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 519; 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
35 F.3d at 520. U.S.S.G. § 2FI.l(bX3)(B) (1994).
35 F.3d at 519.
Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2F1.l(b)(3XB),(1994)).
Id.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
295. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1096 (6th ed. 1990)).
296. Id. at 520 (quoting United States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339 (Sth Cir. 1991)).
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It hardly requires mention that bankruptcy fraud is a serious offense.
Bellew elevates the penalty for any debtor foolish enough to conceal
assets in a bankruptcy proceeding.
XII.

CONCLUSION

Although there is no common theme linking the 1994 decisions by the
Eleventh Circuit covering eleven different subject areas, a number of
succinct rules of thumb, suggestions, or admonitions emerge: Counsel
should adhere to the deadline in Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) for filing a
dischargeability objection, notwithstanding a notice from the clerk that
In seeking an extension of time to
makes the deadline ambiguous.'
file an objection to discharge, counsel is advised to file and serve the
motion upon both the debtor and debtor's counsel prior to the deadline.'s A bankruptcy court's factual findings with respect to fraudulent intent in an objection to discharge or dischargeability will only be
The Eleventh Circuit
set aside on appeal if clearly erroneous.'
insider
preferences, but the
for
avoiding
adopted the Deprizio rationale
impact of that decision is tempered by the amendment to section 550 in
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.wo A trustee may not recover from
the debtor, as opposed to the transferee, the value of a fraudulent
transfer avoided under section 548.301 A trustee must carefully review
a debtor's schedule of exemptions and timely object to the exemption of
an asset with a contingent or unliquidated value that might ultimately
prove to be worth more than the allowable exemption amount.3' 2 In
cases filed prior to October 22, 1994, judgment liens are avoidable under
section 522(f), but only to the extent of the allowable exemption. 3 A
city ordinance prohibiting the assignment of a cable television franchise
agreement will not prevent the cable operator from assuming the

297. Durham Ritz, Inc. v. Williamson (In re Williamson, 15 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 1994).
See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text.
298. Coggin v. Coggin (In re Coggin), 30 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes
20-40 and accompanying text.
299. Equitable Bank v. Miller (In re Miller), 39 F.3d 301 (11th Cir. 1994). See supra
notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
300. Galloway v. First Alabama Bank (In re Wesley Industries, Inc.), 30 F.3d 1438
(11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
301. Coggin v. Coggin (In re Coggin), 30 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes
76-89 and accompanying text.
302. Allen v. Green (In re Green), 31 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes 90112 and accompanying text.
303. Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir.
1994). See supra notes 113-44 and accompanying text.
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franchise agreement in a Chapter 11 case. °4 Postpetition trade debt
in a Chapter 11 case may accrue interest as an administrative expense,
at least until the date of conversion.' ° A Chapter 13 debtor may
modify the plan to cure a postconfirmation arrearage, even with respect
to a debt secured by the debtor's principal residence." Denial of all
fees and expenses is a possible sanction for professionals who are not
disinterested or who hold interests adverse to the bankruptcy estate in
the matters in which they are engaged. 7 Under certain circumstances, a bank may be entitled to recover attorney fees for bringing an
interpleader action in a bankruptcy setting.' The Eleventh Circuit
established a test for substantive consolidation of the estates of
spouses.'
Finally, fraudulent concealment of assets in a bankruptcy
case will result in a two-level increase in the penalty under federal
sentencing guidelines."1 0

304. City of Jamestown v. James Cable Partners, L.P. (In re James Cable Partners,
L.P.), 27 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes 145-63 and accompanying text.
305. Varsity Carpet Servs., Inc. v. Richardson (In re Colortex Indus., Inc.), 19 F.3d 1371
(11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes 164-92 and accompanying text.
306. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Hoggle (In re Hoggle), 12 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir.
1994). See supra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
307. Electro-Wire Prods., Inc. v. Sirote & Permutt, P.C. (In re Prince), 40 F.3d 356
(11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes 210-38 and accompanying text.
308. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Mandalay Shores Co-op. Housing Ass'n, Inc. (In re
Mandalay Shores Co-op Housing As'n, Inc.), 21 F.3d 380 (11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes
239-59 and accompanying text.
309. Reider v. First Deposit Insurance Corp. (In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir.
1994). See supra notes 260-83 and accompanying text.
310. United States v. Bellew, 35 F.3d 518 (11th Cir. 1994). See supra notes 284-96 and
accompanying text.

